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Thousands of gun shows take place in the U.S. each year.  Gun control advocates argue that because
sales at gun shows are much less regulated than other sales, such shows make it easier for potential
criminals to obtain a gun.  Similarly, one might be concerned that gun shows would exacerbate suicide
rates by providing individuals considering suicide with a more lethal means of ending their lives. 
On the other hand, proponents argue that gun shows are innocuous since potential criminals can acquire
guns quite easily through other black market sales or theft.  In this paper, we use data from Gun and
Knife Show Calendar combined with vital statistics data to examine the effect of gun shows.  We find
no evidence that gun shows lead to substantial increases in either gun homicides or suicides.  In addition,
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I.  Introduction 
Thousands of gun shows take place in the United States each year.  Gun control 
advocates argue that the “gun show loophole” makes it easier for potential criminals to obtain a 
gun; the loophole basically allows unlicensed vendors at gun shows to sell firearms without 
conducting background checks on purchasers. In support of this claim, gun control advocates 
commonly cite selected extreme events, such as the April 20, 1999 Columbine High School 
shooting during which Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold shot 26 students, killing 13. Subsequent 
investigations by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) revealed that 
some of the weapons used in the shooting were purchased for Harris and Klebold by a friend at a 
gun show (Brady Campaign, 2005). Though not an issue generally raised by gun control 
advocates, one might also be concerned that gun shows would exacerbate suicide rates by 
providing individuals considering suicide with a more lethal means of ending their lives.   
On the other hand, proponents argue that gun shows are innocuous since potential 
criminals can acquire guns quite easily through other black market sales or theft.  Gun lobbyists 
often cite a Bureau of Justice Statistics survey that finds that only 0.7% of state prison inmates 
who had ever owned a gun reported that they obtained it at a gun show (Harlow, 2001).    
Yet, in response to the concerns about gun shows, 18 states have closed the “gun show 
loophole” by passing legislation that regulates the private transfer of firearms and 6 states have 
imposed additional regulations on gun shows.
1  Despite this legislative activity, there is little 
empirical evidence regarding the effect of gun shows.  This stems in large part from the 
difficulty of obtaining detailed information on gun shows and outcomes such as crime or 
                                                 
1 States became particularly attentive to the gun show loophole after the 1999 Columbine incident and again after 
the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre. Even though the weapons used in the Virginia Tech shooting were purchased at 
federally licensed stores and not gun shows, the Virginia Tech review panel put together a report that recommended 
requiring background checks for firearms sales at gun shows. Governor Kaine made it a priority to enact such a law 
in 2008, but it was defeated in the Virginia Senate. 2 
mortality.  Moreover, because the timing and location of gun shows is clearly not random, it is 
difficult to infer the causal impact of gun shows by simply comparing areas (i.e., states or 
counties) with frequent gun shows to those with fewer shows.  
In this paper, we examine the impact of gun shows on gun and non-gun suicides and 
homicides as well as accidental gun deaths using a unique data set that combines information on 
the date and location of gun shows from Gun and Knife Show Calendar, vital statistics mortality 
data, and census data for the states of Texas and California. The data includes all gun shows and 
deaths occurring in the two states over an eleven year period (1994 to 2004) and are organized at 
the week by zip code level.  We focus our attention on homicides and suicides given that these 
represent more than 96 percent of all 66,513 firearm-related deaths in the two states during our 
eleven-year study period. From 1994 to 2004, there are more than 2,200 gun shows in Texas and 
almost 1,200 gun shows in California. During this period, there are more than 45,000 homicides 
and 60,000 suicides in California and Texas.  
These two states were selected for a number of reasons. Texas and California are the 
nation’s two most populous states, comprising approximately 20% of the total U.S. population, 
and contain a significant number of the country’s gun shows. In addition, they are at opposite 
ends of the spectrum in terms of the degree of gun show regulation. California is known for 
having the most aggressive gun show regulations, including background checks for all gun show 
purchasers and a ten-day waiting period to obtain the gun. Texas, on the other hand, has no such 
regulations. Thus, one might expect to find a very different effect of gun shows in these two 
regulatory environments. This is particularly relevant in light of the Supreme Court’s 2008 ruling 
that the District of Columbia’s 32-year old ban on handguns is incompatible with gun rights 
under the Second Amendment.  3 
To address the potentially endogenous timing and location of gun shows, we examine 
outcome trends within jurisdictions where gun shows occur, exploiting the high frequency 
variation in deaths that we observe in the vital statistics data.  Our baseline empirical 
specification estimates the impact of a gun show on the number of deaths in a zip code in the 
week of a show and the three subsequent weeks, controlling for zip code by year fixed effects as 
well as month fixed effects.  Because zip codes are quite small and because the zip codes in 
which gun shows occur may be primarily commercial (e.g., a convention center) and attract 
many attendees from outside the immediate zip code, we also estimate specifications that utilize 
the number of gun shows that take place within various distances to the “home” zip code.  
The results of our study generally indicate that gun shows do not have substantial impacts 
on either gun homicides or suicides. While there is some evidence of statistically significant 
effects in both California and Texas, these effects are relatively modest in size.  For example, our 
findings indicate that in the average year from 1994 to 2004, there are four additional gun 
suicides in the entire state of California resulting from the 102 gun shows occurring in the 
average year. Moreover, this increase is offset entirely by an almost identical decline in the 
number of non-gun suicides, suggesting that gun shows influence the method but not the number 
of suicides. We find no evidence to suggest that gun shows increased the number of homicides in 
California during our study period. 
Of course, given that California has very stringent regulations of firearms generally and 
gun shows specifically, the results for this state may not generalize to other states.  It could be 
that the background check requirements, ten-day waiting period, and so forth reduce the average 
effect of gun shows on mortality below what it otherwise would be. If true, one would then 4 
expect to detect an effect in states with the least stringent regulation of gun shows, such as 
Texas.  
But our results provide little evidence of a gun show-induced increase in mortality in 
Texas. In fact, we find that in the two weeks following a gun show, the average number of gun 
homicides declines in the area surrounding the gun show.  Aggregating across all gun shows in 
the state, we find that there are approximately 16 fewer gun homicides resulting from the 200 
gun shows in the average year. In the sections below, we discuss several possible explanations 
for this counterintuitive finding. However, it is important to keep in mind that while these results 
are statistically significant, they are quite small – representing just one percent of all homicides 
in Texas in the average year. We find no evidence of an effect on suicides or non-gun homicides 
in Texas. 
There are several limitations to the analysis.  We only examine the geographic areas in 
and around where gun shows take place.  To the extent that guns obtained at shows are 
transported elsewhere, we will not pick up these effects.  In addition, our identification strategy 
relies on high frequency variation that, by definition, focuses on short-term effects.  Specifically, 
we look for spikes in various measures of mortality in the four weeks immediately following a 
gun show.   However, guns are durable and can be used many years in the future.  Our 
identification strategy will not pick up these long-run effects.   
Despite these limitations, we believe that this analysis makes an important contribution to 
understanding the influence of gun shows, the regulation of which is arguably the most active 
area of federal, state, and local firearms policy.  To our knowledge, this is the first study that 
directly examines the impact of gun shows on gun-related deaths.
2  
                                                 
2 Lott (2003) uses aggregate, annual state-level data to investigate the effect of gun show regulations such as 
background check requirements on state-level crime rates. 5 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II provides important 
background information on gun ownership and the institutional and legal arrangements 
surrounding gun shows.  Sections III and IV describe the relevant literature and data used in the 
analysis, respectively. Section V outlines our empirical strategy.  Section VI presents our main 
results and Section VII concludes.   
 
II.  Background 
Gun Ownership in the U.S.  
The manufacture and sale of firearms in the United States is substantial.  According to the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (2002), there are 
more than 1,700 licensed firearms manufacturers and almost 750 licensed importers in the 
United States.  In 2006, approximately 1.4 million handguns and 2.2 million shotguns and rifles 
were manufactured in the U.S., with just 0.3 million of these firearms exported outside of the 
U.S. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2008).  According to Census Bureau statistics published 
by Shooting Industry magazine
3, an additional 1.1 million handguns and 0.7 million rifles and 
shotguns were imported into the U.S. in the same year, implying that more than 5 million new 
firearms were available for sale in that year. 
Statistics on private gun ownership in the United States vary slightly across different 
studies.  The most widely cited estimate of private gun ownership in the United States comes 
from the National Survey of Private Ownership of Firearms (NSPOF), which was conducted in 
1994 for the Police Foundation under the sponsorship of the National Institute of Justice.   
According to an analysis of the NSPOF data by Cook and Ludwig (1996), there are 
approximately 192 million privately-owned firearms in the United States, of which 65 million 
                                                 
3 See http://www.shootingindustry.com/Pages/SpecRep6.html#importhand accessed on August 29, 2008. 6 
are handguns.  Cook and Ludwig (1996) estimate that 44 million people, representing about 35% 
of American households, own a gun.  Further, they find that many people who have guns own 
several: according to their analysis, three-quarters of all guns are owned by people who own four 
or more.  This group, they estimate, amounts to just 10% of American adults. 
By contrast, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 2000) estimated that as of the end of 1996, approximately 242 million firearms were 
available for sale or owned by civilians in the U.S.  That total included roughly 72 million 
handguns, 76 million rifles, and 64 million shotguns.  A slightly higher estimate of U.S. 
household gun ownership comes from the 1997-98 National Gun Policy Survey (National 
Opinion Research Center, 1998), which found that 39% of American households have some type 
of gun, and 24% of households have a handgun. 
 
Institutional Background on Gun Shows 
Thousands of gun shows are held in the U.S. each year at convention centers, 
fairgrounds, civic centers, hotels, armories, VFW halls and other locations.  The majority of gun 
shows are promoted by a core group of about 175 organizations and individuals.  Gun shows are 
generally open to the public, and attendees often pay a modest admission fee to attend.  Most 
shows are held over the weekend and last for two days, drawing an average of 2,500 to 5,000 
people per show.  To rent a table from a promoter, vendors pay fees typically ranging from $5 to 
$50.  The number of tables at gun shows ranges widely, from as few as 50 to as many as 2,000 
(U.S. Departments of Justice and Treasury, 1999).
4 
                                                 
4 Various types of firearms are sold at gun shows.  These include new and used handguns, shotguns, rifles, and curio 
or relic firearms (e.g., firearms of historical interest).  Semiautomatic assault weapons may be sold at gun shows if 
they were manufactured before 1994, and large capacity magazines and machine gun parts also may be sold if they 
were manufactured before certain dates.  In addition, gun show vendors also usually sell ammunition, gun literature, 7 
  Lott (2003) states that roughly 1,900 gun shows were held in the U.S. in 1991 and that 
this number increased to a high of 2,907 in 1996, but then declined to roughly 2,400 in 2001.  He 
finds that western and rural states tend to have the greatest number of gun shows per capita, and 
that states with higher gun ownership rates have significantly more gun shows.  In 1998, for 
example, Wyoming, Montana, South Dakota, Oregon and West Virginia topped his list of shows 
per 100,000 residents, while Connecticut, Alaska, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Hawaii had 
the lowest per capita rates.  A group of federal agencies using the same data source (a periodical 
titled Gun Show Calendar) came up with a much higher figure for the overall number of gun 
shows in 1998 – 4,442 shows compared with the 2,600 reported by Lott (2003).  States with the 
most gun shows included Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois, and California (U.S. 
Departments of Justice and Treasury, 1999). 
Private citizens can acquire firearms through a number of channels, including gun stores,  
department stores, pawnshops, the mail, family members, and friends.  The share of guns that 
private individuals acquire through gun shows appears to be relatively small.  The NSPOF 
estimated that in 1993 and 1994, approximately 239,000 firearms were bought annually at gun 
shows and flea markets in the U.S.  This represents 4% of both long guns and handguns acquired 
by private individuals from all sources in those years (Cook & Ludwig, 1996).  Similarly, a 1997 
survey of 18,000 state prison inmates by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that only 0.7% 
and 1.7% of inmates who had ever owned a gun said they had obtained it at a gun show or flea 
market, respectively (Harlow, 2001).  Despite this, an ATF study (2000) found that 14% of their 
criminal trafficking investigations between 1996 and 1998 involved guns purchased from gun 
shows; about 46% involved straw purchases (i.e. when an individual purchases a gun for 
                                                                                                                                                             
and gun accessories.  Gun shows often include knife vendors and sellers of air guns.  For the most part, gun shows 
offer firearms for both those seeking to purchase handguns, as well as the sportsman and hunter.  (U.S. Departments 
of Justice and Treasury, 1999). 8 
someone else) and 20% involved unlicensed sellers.
5  This suggests that while relatively few 
criminals may themselves make a purchase at a gun show, a much larger number may obtain a 
gun from someone who previously did purchase at a show. 
 
The Gun Show Loophole 
  Certain individuals – primarily felons and those convicted of domestic abuse – are 
prohibited from purchasing or possessing a firearm under federal law.
6  The “gun show 
loophole” refers to the fact that federal law requires “federal firearms licensees” (FFLs) (i.e., 
those licensed by the government to manufacture, import, or deal in firearms) to conduct 
background checks on non-licensed persons seeking to obtain firearms, but does not require such 
checks by those who transfer firearms and do not meet the statutory test of being “engaged in the 
business” to do so (Krouse, 2005).  Therefore, while a gun dealer who operates a gun shop is 
obliged to conduct background checks on potential buyers under federal law, private sellers at 
gun shows who “transfer” firearms are not obliged to conduct background checks of potential 
buyers.  FFLs comprise 50% to 75% of the vendors at most gun shows, so some private venders 
could use this “loophole” to entice potential customers to their tables (U.S. Departments of 
Justice and Treasury, 1999).   As a result, some assert that it is easy for criminals to obtain guns 
simply by purchasing them at gun shows (Krouse, 2005). 
While federal law does not regulate sales at gun shows, a number of states have passed 
legislation regulating at least some of these sales.  The most common type of regulation is the 
                                                 
5 http://www.atf.treas.gov/pub/fire-explo_pub/pdf/followingthegun_internet.pdf 
6 There are eight categories under the Brady Act that render individuals ineligible to purchase or possess firearms.  
These include: felony convictions, misdemeanor convictions, fugitive status, an adjudication of mental illness, 
issuance of a restraining order against the individual, people convicted of drug-related offenses, underage status, or 
alien status.  Many state laws contain these same prohibitions.  In addition, some state laws also prohibit people 
convicted of alcohol offenses and juvenile offenses from buying or possessing firearms (U.S. Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003b). 9 
requirement of a background check, which is determined through an investigation of criminal 
records kept by the FBI or state “point of contact” agencies (POC’s) such as local and state 
police agencies.
7 For example, the states of California and Rhode Island along with the District 
of Columbia require background checks on all gun purchases, including those that occur at gun 
shows.  Five additional states (Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, and Oregon) have less 
comprehensive regulations but do require background checks for all firearms purchases 
occurring at gun shows (LCAV, 2008).  The vast majority of states, however, do not require a 
background check for transactions occurring at gun shows. 
One recent study (Wintemute, 2007) compared gun shows in California, which is 
considered to have “a uniquely restrictive regulatory environment for gun shows”, with shows in 
Arizona, Nevada, Texas, and Florida.  These four states do not regulate transactions at gun 
shows or any private party firearms sales. In addition to the background checks described above, 
California requires that any individual who purchases a gun, whether at a gun show or anywhere 
else, wait ten days before receiving the gun.
8 The results from this study suggest that there were 
fewer illegal “straw purchases” and undocumented gun sales at California’s shows.  Given this 
finding, one might expect to find a very different effect of gun shows in a state such as California 
with aggressive regulations than in a state such as Texas with no such regulations. We 
investigate this issue in the sections that follow.  
 
                                                 
7 National figures on background checks are kept by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. In 2005, there were 8.3 million 
background checks, with 131,900 of these leading to a purchase denial.  
8Additional gun show specific regulations that exist in California are described in California Penal Code 12071.4, 
which is also known as the Gun Show Enforcement and Security Act of 2000. For instance, this includes the 
requirement that each vendor at a gun show submits his personal information (name, birth date, driver’s license 
number) as well as that of his employees to the producer of the show. It is also important to note that regulations that 
apply to the purchase of a firearm at a location other than a gun show generally apply to gun show purchases as well.  10 
III.  Prior Literature 
Prior Evidence on the Relationship between Guns, Crime, and Suicide 
  A large body of previous research has investigated the effect of gun ownership on crime.  
Much of this work exploited variation over time at the national level in rates of gun sales or 
ownership (Kleck, 1984) or across areas at a point in time (Cook, 1983).  One concern with 
much of this earlier work is that the factors that influence variation across time or areas in gun 
ownership may themselves exert an independent effect on crime and not all of these factors may 
be observable in the available data. 
  To address this concern, Lott and Mustard (1997) use the passage of state concealed 
weapons laws to estimate the effect of guns on homicide, robbery, and other types of crime. 
Their findings indicate that crime declined in those states that passed concealed weapons laws, 
suggesting that gun ownership reduces crime through deterrence. This study was then the focus 
of much subsequent work, some of which was supportive (Moody, 2001) and some which found 
that the results were not robust to a variety of assumptions and modeling choices (Ayres and 
Donohue, 1999; Black and Nagin, 1998). 
  Two more recent studies estimate the effect of increases in gun ownership on crime using 
panel data on crime and estimated gun ownership for the 1980s and 1990s (Duggan, 2001; Cook 
and Ludwig, 2004). Both studies found that increases in gun ownership led to increases in the 
homicide rate with little corresponding effect for other types of crime. Interestingly, the entire 
effect for homicide was attributable to gun homicides in both studies. 
  A similarly large body of work has explored the effect of gun ownership on the suicide 
rate.  This is perhaps not surprising given that, according to the National Center for Health 
Statistics, more than 50% of all suicides committed in the U.S. in 2005 involved a firearm.  11 
Many of these studies have found that gun owners are significantly more likely to take their own 
lives than their observably similar counterparts without a gun (Kellermann et al. 1992, Sloan et 
al. 1990, Loftin et al. 1991) and that states with greater gun ownership have higher suicide rates 
(Azrael, Hemenway, and Miller, 2002). 
One challenge for this area of research is that firearm owners are likely to systematically 
differ in unobserved ways from their counterparts who do not own a firearm. For instance, 
Duggan (2003) documents that both the gun and the non-gun suicide rates are higher in states 
with high rates of gun ownership.  To address this concern, Ludwig and Cook (2000) examine 
whether the implementation of the Brady Act, which required that licensed firearms dealers 
observe a 5-day waiting period and initiate a background check for handgun sales, was 
associated with a reduction in the suicide rate in the 32 states that were affected by the 
requirements versus the 18 states that were not; the latter group of states already met the 
requirements of the Brady Act.  By interrupting the sale of a handgun and making the purchaser 
wait, the Brady Act gives the purchaser time to change his mind. However, the authors’ evidence 
suggests that the policy only lowered the suicide rate for individuals age 55 and older. 
  Taken together, the results from this research suggest that there is a relationship between 
gun ownership rates and both gun suicide and gun homicide rates.  Though not completely in 
agreement, much of the literature indicates that this relationship is positive; i.e. increases in gun 
ownership rates are associated with increases in gun homicide and suicide rates.  
 
Prior Evidence on the Effects of Gun Shows  
Yet, despite the evident relationship between gun ownership and homicide and suicide 
rates, there has been little empirical study of the effects of gun shows on crime and, to our 12 
knowledge, no studies of the effect of gun shows on gun suicides or accidental deaths.  In a 
widely cited study, the BATF reviewed a random sample of 314 ATF investigations between 
1991 and 1998 involving gun shows, and found that felons buying or selling firearms were 
involved in more than 46% of the investigations.  In addition, the study found that in more than a 
third of the gun show investigations reviewed, the firearms involved were known to have been 
used in subsequent crimes, including homicide, robbery, burglary, assault and drug offenses 
(U.S. Departments of Justice and Treasury, 1999).  It is not clear how to interpret these results, 
however, since the sample is constructed to only include shows that were under investigation.   
Using aggregate annual state level data and controlling for state and year fixed effects as 
well as a number of demographic variables, Lott (2003) finds that laws requiring background 
checks at gun shows are negatively associated with the prevalence of gun shows in a state.
9  In 
the same analysis, Lott examines violent crime rates before and after the introduction of state 
laws to require background checks for private transfers of handguns.  Using a similar empirical 
specification, he compares nine states that closed this loophole by 1994 to 33 states that never 
implemented such laws and finds no evidence that these gun show laws reduced violent crime.  
In fact, he finds that such laws are positively associated with murder, robbery, and auto theft. 
 
IV.  Data 
Data Description 
To investigate whether the number of deaths changes in the weeks leading up to or 
following a gun show, we compiled a unique data set of gun show and mortality information for 
the states of Texas and California. These data are organized at the zip code by week level. In 
                                                 
9 He also provides evidence that state laws banning assault weapons and/or imposing waiting periods reduce the 
number of gun shows.  13 
particular, we determined the number of gun shows in each week from 1994 to 2004 in each zip 
code.  This gun show data was then combined with zip code by week mortality data, including 
various types of gun deaths, as well as demographic and socioeconomic characteristics from the 
2000 census. Finally, using the latitude and longitude of the centroid of each zip code listed in 
the 2000 census, we calculated the number of gun shows in a given week within 5, 10, and 25 
miles of each zip code. This allows us to account for the fact that that there are likely to be many 
individuals who attend the gun show but who do not live in the same zip code as the show. 
We aggregate the data to the zip code by week level (rather than zip code by date) to: (i) 
increase statistical precision and (ii) account for the fact that gun shows typically occur on 
weekends, when mortality likely would be different than on other days for reasons unrelated to 
gun shows. Using a symmetric time period as our unit of observation also reduces the possibility 
that pre-post comparisons will be driven by factors other than the existence of a gun show. 
Because gun shows typically begin on either Friday or Saturday, we begin each week on a Friday 
and end it on a Thursday. Therefore, the first week of data begins on Friday, January 7, 1994 and 
the last week ends on Thursday, December 30, 2004; this results in 573 weeks of data. 
Information on gun shows was obtained from Gun and Knife Show Calendar, a national 
magazine that lists the dates and locations of gun shows throughout the country. For each Texas 
and California gun show from 1994 to 2004, we especially noted the zip code of the gun show 
location as well as the date(s) of the show. Figure 1 presents the annual number of gun shows 
over this eleven-year period: there are 2,221 shows in Texas and 1,196 in California.  In both 
states, a decline in the prevalence of gun shows is observed. The number of shows decreased 
from 125 in 1994 to 77 in 2004 in California, with a peak of 173 in 1996, and from 245 in 1994 
to 191 in 2004 in Texas, with a minimum of 157 in 2001.  It is important to note, however, that 14 
the location of gun shows is not evenly distributed across zip codes. For instance, only 120 Texas 
zip codes and 98 California zip codes have at least one gun show; 63 and 46 zip codes, 
respectively, have five or more shows over the sample period. We will return later in this section 
to a more in depth analysis of where gun shows occur. 
To examine the impact of gun shows on various types of mortality, we utilize individual-
level vital statistics data for the states of Texas and California.
10 We focus on detailed 
information about the deaths of all residents of these states from 1994 to 2004, i.e. corresponding 
to the available gun show data.
11  Over this time period, there were 1,609,203 deaths of any type 
in Texas and 2,496,589 deaths in California.  Following previous research, we use the 
International Classification of Disease cause-of-death codes in our mortality data to focus on 
those deaths that would be potentially influenced by firearms availability, including homicides, 
suicides, and deaths resulting from the accidental discharge of a firearm. A fourth category that 
can be defined includes deaths that are firearm related, but for which the cause is undetermined; 
that is, it is not clear whether the death is accidental or committed with intent.   
For each year and state, Figure 2 plots the total number of gun deaths in each of these 
four categories. In both California and Texas, the greatest number of gun deaths occurs in 1994. 
During this first year of data, there are 3,368 gun deaths in Texas and 4,994 in California.  
Similar trends in the number of gun deaths over the sample period are seen in both states. The 
number of gun deaths decreases until 1999 in California and 2000 in Texas; after these years, the 
trend reverses slightly and the number of gun deaths remains fairly constant until the end of the 
sample.  For instance, the number of gun deaths decreases by more than 41% (2,079 deaths) in 
                                                 
10 The California data was obtained from the Office of Health Information and Research in the California Center for 
Health Statistics (CAHS). The Texas data was obtained from the Center for Health Statistics in the Texas 
Department of State Health Services. 
11 We focus on deaths of ‘state’ residents to be consistent across states. For instance, while the California data set 
also includes deaths of non-Californians occurring in the state of California, the Texas data set does not. 15 
California between 1994 and 1999; from 1999 to 2004 there is an increase of just over 6% (267 
deaths). Similar patterns are also observed for both gun suicides and gun homicides, and thus the 
trend in gun deaths is not being driven by any one category of death.   
While Figure 2 indicates that similar trends in the level of gun deaths are observed across 
these two states, it is important to note that the percent of homicides and suicides committed with 
a gun varies both across states and over time. In a typical year over this sample period, 62.2% of 
Texas suicides are committed with a gun compared to 48.4% of California suicides. Though 
California has the lower gun suicide rate, it actually has a higher proportion of homicides 
committed with a gun: 71.9% compared with 64.2% in Texas. To put these statistics in a national 
context, note that in 2003, 53.7% and 67.2% of the suicides and homicides, respectively, in the 
United States were committed with a firearm.  The remainder of the paper focuses on homicides 
and suicides, given that these two categories make up more than 96% of all gun deaths in Texas 
and California from 1994 to 2004. 
To merge the mortality and gun show data, we also identify the date and zip code of 
residence for each death. We drop from the analysis: (i) deaths with incomplete zip code 
information (0.9% in Texas and none in California), (ii) zip codes not listed in the 2000 Census 
(since 5, 10, or 25 mile distances cannot be calculated), (iii) weeks for which a four-week lead or 
lag cannot be created, since many specifications will look at the four weeks leading up to and 
following a gun show, and (iv) zip codes that have either zero population or zero land area.  
Taken together, this implies a reduction in the number of Texas and California gun shows by 
10.2% and 5.9%, respectively, and a reduction in the total number of deaths by 3.3% and 3.1%, 
respectively. The final sample includes 1,053,326 observations in Texas (566 weeks * 1,861 zip 
codes) and 941,824 observations in California (566 weeks * 1,664 zip codes). Within this 16 
sample, there were 1,556,113 deaths and 1,995 gun shows in Texas and 2,421,339 deaths and 
1,126 gun shows in California. 
 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the mortality data. For each state, we present the 
average weekly number of gun-related deaths per capita separately for: (i) all zip codes, (ii) zip 
codes with at least one gun show from 1994 to 2004, (iii) zip codes with at least one gun show in 
a 10-mile radius, and (iv) zip codes with zero gun shows. The table indicates that zip codes with 
a gun show or a nearby gun show look different than zip codes with no gun shows. For instance, 
in California, the average per capita number of weekly gun deaths is about 74 percent greater in 
the 1,566 zip codes that have no gun shows than in the 98 zip codes with at least one gun show 
and 38 percent greater when compared to the 901 zip codes with a show within 10 miles. These 
differences are driven by the per capita number of gun suicides. In contrast, the per capita 
number of weekly gun deaths in the 1,741 Texas zip codes without a gun show is just 22 percent 
greater than that in the 120 Texas zip codes with at least one show; this difference is again driven 
by gun suicides. Note that it is important to take the zip code population into account when 
comparing deaths across zip codes, as zip codes with larger populations are more likely to have 
gun shows (as we will shortly see) and will clearly have more deaths. 
Table 1 also contrasts the average number of weekly gun deaths per capita for weeks with 
and without a gun show for the samples of zip codes with at least one gun show (see columns (3) 
and (4)) and those with a show within 10 miles (see columns (6) and (7)). No clear pattern across 
states emerges. For the most part in Texas, there is very little difference between the average 
number of weekly gun deaths, homicides, and suicides when comparing gun show and non-gun 17 
show weeks. In California, the average number of weekly gun deaths per capita differs slightly 
across gun show and non-gun show weeks when looking at zip codes that have at least one show. 
However, in these zip codes, the average number of weekly gun suicides per capita is smaller in 
gun show weeks than non gun show weeks while the opposite relationship is seen for gun 
homicides. The most striking differences across gun show and non-gun show weeks are seen in 
California zip codes that have at least one show within 10 miles. In these zip codes, there are 
almost twice as many gun deaths per capita in non-gun show weeks compared to gun show 
weeks; this difference is primarily driven by gun suicides, though the same pattern is seen for 
gun homicides.   
It is important to note that while the statistics presented in Table 1 eliminate some of the 
heterogeneity across zip codes by comparing gun show and non gun show weeks in only the 
samples of gun show zip codes or zip codes with a close show, substantial heterogeneity still 
remains. Specifically, within the sample of zip codes with at least one gun show, for instance, 
there is also substantial variation in the number of weeks with a gun show; thus, some zip codes 
may be weighted more when considering gun show weeks.
12  
Additional summary statistics describing the number of weekly gun shows and deaths, as 
well as demographic measures, are presented in Appendix Table 1 for the samples of Texas and 
California zip codes with at least one gun show in a 10-mile radius. There are substantial 
differences between Texas and California zip codes, which support the decision to conduct the 
empirical analysis separately for these two states. For instance, the average number of weekly 
gun shows in a zip code (or a zip code within 10 miles) is more than twice as large in Texas than 
California. Yet, the average number of weekly deaths (including gun deaths) is higher in 
                                                 
12 For example, a zipcode with 10 shows will contribute 10 times as much to the “gun show week” averages as will a 
zipcode with just one show. 18 
California. Population density is more than twice as large, on average, in California zip codes 
than Texas zip codes while Texas zip codes tend to be more rural. Racial composition is quite 
different across the two states: as compared with Texas, California’s population has smaller 
fractions of White and Black, but larger fractions of Asian and multi-race. In addition, gun 
ownership – proxied for with the fraction of suicides committed with a gun, which is considered 
to be the most reliable proxy of gun ownership (Azrael, Cook, and Miller, 2004) – is 
substantially higher in Texas than California zip codes. 
  
Where and When Do Gun Shows Occur? 
  To explore the characteristics of areas that have one or more gun shows, Table 2 presents 
summary statistics of demographic variables for zip codes with at least one gun show over the 
sample period in column (1) and zip codes with no gun shows in column (2). The difference in 
means for these two groups of zip codes and whether the difference is significant are presented in 
column (3). Parallel measures are presented in columns (4) through (6) for zip codes with and 
without at least one show in a 10-mile radius.  
The results presented in Table 2 indicate that gun shows are significantly more likely to 
occur in: (i) more populated areas, (ii) more urban areas, (iii) more Hispanic areas, (iv) more 
Black areas, and (v) zip codes with fewer guns, again proxied for with the fraction of suicides 
committed with a gun. These significant differences are seen in both California and Texas. Gun 
shows are also more likely to be located in zip codes that are in a metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA); this difference is significant in the California 10-mile sample and both samples in Texas. 
In addition, gun shows are not evenly dispersed over the course of a year. Regressions of 
the number of gun shows per week on month dummies indicate that there are significantly more 19 
gun shows in October and November relative to January while there are significantly fewer gun 
shows in May, June, and July.  
 
V.  Empirical Strategy 
We are interested in examining the impact of gun shows on mortality, including suicides, 
homicides, and accidental gun deaths.  The primary challenge stems from the fact that gun shows 
may occur in places, or at times, that have more deaths for other, unobserved reasons.  For 
example, as we saw in Table 2, there is some evidence that gun shows occur in places where 
relatively fewer people own guns.  Failing to account for this could lead to spurious estimates of 
the impact of gun shows on mortality.  Similarly, the number of gun shows occurring in Texas 
and California during weeks in the second quarter of the year is significantly less than the 
number of gun shows in other quarters; once again, this could yield spurious results given the 
seasonal nature of homicide and suicide.  To address this potential endogeneity, we examine 
outcome trends within jurisdictions where gun shows occur, exploiting the high frequency 
variation in deaths that we observe in the vital statistics data.   
In our baseline model, we estimate specifications that take the following form:  
(1)  ,, 1 , 2 , 3 01 2 3 z t zt zt zt t t z t z t y nshowst nshowstm nshowstm λ γε −− − =+ + + + +  
where yzt is the number of deaths in zip code z in week t, and the “nshows” variables indicate the 
number of shows that occurred in zip code z in the contemporaneous week and in several prior 
weeks. The nshowst0 variable indicates the number of gun shows that took place in the 
contemporaneous week.  Note that since most gun shows take place over the weekend, and we 
define weeks to run from Friday to Thursday, the coefficient on this variable will capture the 
effect of a gun show on gun deaths during the show and in the four or five days immediately 20 
following the show.  The variable nshowstm1 indicates the number of gun shows that took place 
in zip code z in week t-1.  Hence, the coefficient on this variable will capture the effect of a gun 
show on the number of gun deaths between 8 and 14 days following the start of the show. The 
variable nshowstm23 indicates the number of gun shows that took place in zip code z in weeks t-
2 or t-3, and thus captures the effect of a gun show on the number of deaths several weeks later.
13  
  To account for unobservable location and period specific factors that might be correlated 
with the occurrence of gun shows as well as the number of gun-related deaths, we include a set 
of location*time period fixed effects, denoted above by γzt.  In our baseline model, we include 
zip code*year fixed effects to capture location-specific factors that are either time-invariant or 
change slowly over time (e.g., demographic shifts, changes in police practice, etc.) as well as 
month fixed effects (e.g., separate indicators for January, February, etc.) to capture common 
seasonality-related trends across zip codes.  We later show that our results are robust to a variety 
of alternative controls for unobserved location and/or time effects.   
As an important sensitivity analysis, we estimate the following model that extends the 
specification in equation (1) to include a series of variables (i.e., the nshowst# variables) that 
capture changes in mortality leading up to a gun show:   
(2) 
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The nshowst# variables reflect the number of gun shows that took place in zip code z in weeks 
t+1, t+2, etc.  These leading indicators serve two purposes.  First, they serve as a test for the 
presence of unobserved factors that occurred close to the time of a gun show, and may be leading 
                                                 
13 In preliminary analyses, we allowed the coefficient on the number of shows in these weeks to vary, but found no 
difference in the coefficient estimates.  Hence, for the sake of parsimony, we present results from a model that 
restricts the effects to be the same across these weeks. 21 
to spurious correlations in equation (1).  For example, if we see a large positive coefficient on the 
nshowst1 variable, indicating a spike in the number of gun-related deaths in the week preceding a 
gun show, we might be less willing to interpret a large positive coefficient on the nshowstm1 
variable as evidence that gun shows lead to an increase in gun-related deaths.  Second, they 
allow us to explore temporal substitution in the number of deaths that might be related to the 
presence of a gun show.  For example, if potential criminals “wait” to commit their crimes until a 
gun show provides them an opportunity to purchase a firearm, then one might see a decline in 
deaths leading up to a gun show followed by a spike in deaths immediately after the show.  In 
practice, we find that the inclusion of leading indicators does not change our results, and does not 
provide any indication of temporal substitution.  
In the discussion above, we have focused on the relationship between gun shows and 
gun-related deaths in a particular zip code.  However, zip codes are quite small.  The median zip 
code in California (Texas) is only 17 (52) square miles, and the urban zip codes in which many 
gun shows occur are considerably smaller in terms of land area.  Indeed, in some cases, the zip 
code in which a gun show occurs is primarily a commercial area with a negligible residential 
population.  While there is no data on the residential location of gun show patrons, it seems 
likely that gun shows attract many people outside the immediate zip code.  Thus, one might 
expect the presence of a gun show in a particular zip code to influence the number of gun-related 
deaths in neighboring zip codes.   
If one had a strong reason to believe, ex ante, that gun shows attracted patrons within a 
certain geographic area, then one would want to use this information in determining the proper 
specification.  In the absence of any compelling evidence on this matter, we experiment with 
specifications that allow gun shows to influence mortality in zip codes located within various 22 
distances of the show itself.  In our baseline specification, we allow gun shows to influence 
mortality within a 10-mile radius of the zip code in which the show took place. In these 
specifications, the nshowstm1 variable reflects the number of gun shows that took place in week 
t-1 in zip codes located within 10-miles of zip code z, where we calculate distance from the 
centroid of each zip code.  Note that the unit of observation for these regressions is still the zip 
code*week, and the outcome still measures the number of deaths in zip code z in week t.   
We then present results for 5-mile and 25-mile radii along with results limiting the impact 
of gun shows to the zip code of the show itself.  It is worth noting that, unlike the other 
sensitivity analyses we present, the results from these alternative specifications of distance to 
show will not provide a “falsification test” for our baseline model.  While we have some 
intuition that a gun show in one zip code will likely influence mortality in neighboring zip codes, 
we have no reason to believe that effects we find within, say, a 25-mile radius are “better” than 
the effects within a 10-mile radius.  Instead, one should view this exercise as identifying where 
potential effects may exist.   
 
Estimation 
Throughout the analysis, our outcome will be some measure of the number of gun-related 
deaths in a particular location at a particular time. However, the choice of the correct 
specification depends in large part on the way in which one believes that gun shows influence 
gun-related deaths. If one believes that a gun show will reduce the “shadow price” of purchasing 
a gun by the same amount for all individuals in each location, then (all else equal) one might 
expect the impact of the gun show to be proportional to the population in the relevant 
jurisdiction.  For example, a gun show that takes place in a town of 10,000 people might allow 23 
the one person who is contemplating suicide sufficiently easy access to a firearm to induce her to 
kill herself, resulting in one additional gun death.  In an otherwise comparable town of 100,000 
people, one would expect there to be 10 such individuals who might be induced to commit 
suicide by the “gun show-induced” availability of a firearm.  This type of proportional effect 
suggests a specification in which the outcome is measured per capita (e.g, deaths per 100,000 
residents), or is measured relative to the average number of deaths in the location.
14   
On the other hand, if one believes that gun shows will have a similar impact on the 
number of deaths across locations regardless of population, one could estimate a simple OLS 
model using the number of gun deaths in a particular location*week as the outcome.  This 
specification would be reasonable if one believed that the gun shows induce a smaller change in 
gun availability (i.e., a smaller price reduction) for the average person in larger geographic areas 
because transportation costs limit the access to gun shows in large areas, or perhaps because 
there are already many alternative ways to obtain a firearm without going through standard 
background checks in larger areas.  If the supply of guns available at gun shows is limited 
relative to the demand, this might also be a reason that the effect is not proportional to the 
population.  
  Because we believe that the effects of gun shows are likely to be only partially proportional 
to the population size, we estimate several different specifications.  To begin, we estimate a 
straightforward OLS model where the outcome is the number of deaths.
15  In addition, we 
estimate negative binomial and Poisson regression models. In these models, the mean number of 
deaths (μ) is modeled as an exponential function of the predictors (i.e., μ = e
xβ), so that the 
                                                 
14 To the extent that the total population is highly correlated with the number of gun-related deaths in a jurisdiction, 
models that estimate proportional effects relative to a population base will be quite similar to those that use the 
number of deaths as the base.    
15 This model will suffer from extreme heteroskedasticity given the variation in zip code size.  Because we present 
cluster-robust standard errors (clustering by zip code), our standard errors will be consistent, but not efficient.    24 
resulting estimates reflect the proportional effect of gun shows.  Specifically, the exponentiated 
coefficients from these models can be interpreted as incidence rate ratios, which reflect the 
percent effect of gun shows on the number of deaths in a zip code.
16  Both the negative binomial 
and Poisson regressions are consistent under our identifying assumptions. The negative binomial 
is a generalization of the Poisson regression model that allows for the variance of the outcome 
measure to differ from the mean.  This technique is ideal for dealing with count data with over-
dispersion since it provides more efficient estimates than Poisson regression.  In order to 
accommodate the zip code-year fixed effects in our model, we use the fixed effects negative 
binomial model developed by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984).  However, Allison and 
Waterman (2002) have shown that this model is not a true fixed effects estimator in the sense 
that it does not necessarily control for all stable unit-specific covariates as does the standard 
linear fixed effect model.  Thus, we present estimates from a fixed effects Poisson regression, 
which does provide consistent estimates in the presence of time-invariant unit-specific 
confounding factors.  
  In all models, we will account for possible serial correlation within jurisdictions and other 
forms of heteroskedasticity.  In the OLS models, we estimated Eiker-White standard errors that 
are clustered by zip code.  In the negative binomial and Poisson models, we use a block 
bootstrap where the blocking variable is the zip code.  
 
                                                 
16 One might also estimate models with a binary outcome indicating whether the location experienced at least one 
gun-related death in a given week.  This approach may attenuate any effects of gun shows, however.  The reason for 
this is that large jurisdictions almost always experience at least one death and, conversely, small jurisdictions almost 
never experience a death.  This will tend to bias the coefficients on our gun show indicators toward zero.  To see 
this, consider a large jurisdiction such as Los Angeles that has at least one gun death every week.  Here the 
coefficient on our gun show measures will be zero by construction.  The same will be true for jurisdictions where no 
gun-deaths occur. 25 
VI.  Results 
In this section, we present our findings.  The first subsection describes our main or 
baseline results. The next subsection presents a series of sensitivity analyses.  The final 
subsection explores the heterogeneity of the effects.    
 
Main Results 
Table 3 presents our main results that focus on the set of zip codes that have at least one 
gun show within a 10-mile radius over the entire sample period, which includes roughly 53 and 
33 percent of zip codes in California and Texas, respectively.  Each column reflects a separate 
regression following equation (1) in the section above.  In addition to the gun show variables 
shown in the table, all models include zip code*year and month fixed effects, and the standard 
errors are clustered by zip code. Results are shown for gun homicides and suicides as well as the 
number of non-gun homicides and suicides. This allows us to explore whether the increase in 
gun availability due to gun shows shifted the mode of homicide and suicide, but not necessarily 
the total number of deaths.     
Looking first at the California results, we see only limited evidence of any effect, and the 
significant effects we do find are relatively modest in size.  There are no statistically or 
economically significant effects for any of the outcomes in either the week of the show or the 
two to three weeks following a show.   However, there is some evidence of an interesting 
substitution pattern in the first week following the week of a gun show.  For both homicides and 
suicides, gun deaths seem to increase slightly while non-gun deaths decrease slightly 8 to 14 
days following a gun show.  This pattern is strongest for suicide.  Gun suicides increase by .0023 
in the second week after a gun show.  Given the baseline mean of .025, this represents an 26 
increase of roughly 10 percent.  At the same time, non-gun suicides decrease by exactly the same 
absolute amount (.0023).
17  As mentioned previously, a 10-day waiting period upon the purchase 
of a firearm exists in California. Thus, consistent with our results, one would not expect to find 
any significant change in gun deaths until at least the week following the show. In fact, a number 
of studies indicate that suicides occur most frequently on Mondays for both males and females 
and most age groups (Maldonado and Kraus, 1991; Lester; 1979). If we assume that the typical 
gun show purchase occurs on Saturday, then the 10th day occurs on the following Monday, 
which is included in our first week after the show variable.  
The point estimates for gun and non-gun homicides display the same pattern, but are 
smaller in both absolute and relative magnitude.  In fact, the point estimate of .0012 on gun 
homicides is not significant at conventional levels. Moreover, these estimates are reasonably 
precise.  The confidence interval on the second week gun homicide result ranges from 
approximately -.0018 to .0042.  Given the baseline mean of .035, this estimate allows us to rule 
out an increase in gun homicides of more than 12 percent.
18  
In Texas, the effects of gun shows appear quite different.  We find a sharp decline in the 
number of gun-homicides in the weeks immediately following a gun show.  The one- and two-
week estimates suggest reductions of about .0022 deaths in each week, roughly 20 percent of the 
sample mean.  It is not clear what might be driving these seemingly “perverse” results.  One 
potential explanation is that local police are more vigilant in the weeks immediately following 
gun shows.  While not statistically significant, the negative point estimates for non-gun 
                                                 
17 While not significant at conventional levels, it is worth noting that the point estimate for the week following a 
show in the gun suicide model is -.0019, roughly equivalent in magnitude and opposite in sign as the two-week 
effect.  Taken together, these results suggest that gun shows would not change the number of gun suicides in the first 
two weeks following a show. 
18 It is important to keep in mind that this second week gun homicide coefficient captures the effect 8 to 14 days 
following a gun show. Yet, because homicides occur most frequently over the weekend, the peak homicide period 
during this 8 to 14 day period likely occurs before the 10-day waiting period is over. Of course, it is possible that 
criminals waiting for a gun use that gun upon receiving it, regardless of whether it is a weekday or weekend. 27 
homicides in this sample are consistent with this hypothesis.  Alternatively, criminals (or 
potential criminals) might use gun shows as an opportunity to sell their weapons, thus reducing 
their ability to commit gun crimes in the short-run.  Unlike California, we find no evidence that 
gun shows in Texas influence gun or non-gun suicide rates. 
Table 4 explores the sensitivity of our results to the size of the geographic area in which 
we allow gun shows to have an impact.  In our baseline specification, we allow gun shows to 
influence mortality in any zip code located within a 10-mile radius of the zip code in which the 
gun show took place.  Here we show results for three alternative specifications: (i) gun shows 
that take place only within the actual zip code in which mortality is measured; (ii) gun shows that 
take place within a 5-mile radius of the zip code in which mortality is measured, and (iii) gun 
shows that take place within a 25-mile radius of the zip code in which mortality is measured.  It 
is important to note that the sample that provides the identifying variation differs across 
specifications.   
Columns 1-4 show results that focus only on gun shows that take place in the same zip 
code in which mortality is measured. Because we limit our analysis to only those zip codes with 
at least one gun show during the sample period, our sample here includes less than 10 percent of 
all zip codes (98 out of 1,664 zip codes in California and 120 out of 1,861 zip codes in Texas). In 
Texas, the “perverse” increase in homicides following gun shows disappears, and there is a 
significant and positive effect on gun suicides in the week following a gun show.  In California, 
the week two substitution from non-gun to gun deaths is no longer apparent, and gun shows do 
not appear to have any consistent impacts on gun homicides or suicides.  Columns 5-8 show the 
results using a 5-mile radius.  These results are similar to our baseline (10-mile radius) results, 28 
though somewhat less dramatic.  Finally, columns 9-12 show results using a 25-mile radius, 
which indicate no significant effects.   
These results suggest that the impact of gun shows extends beyond the immediate 
vicinity in which the shows take place, but is limited to regions within 25 miles of the show. As 
mentioned above, the results based on different geographic “catchment areas” should not be 
thought of as specification checks per se, but rather as an exploration of the nature and scope of 
potential impacts.  
Perhaps most importantly, regardless of how one prioritizes the different specifications 
presented above, we find no evidence that gun shows have substantial impacts on either gun 
homicides or gun suicides.  For example, in our estimates for the state of California that use a 
ten-mile radius, we estimate that gun shows lead to an additional four gun suicides in the average 
year, with this offset by an almost identical decline in the number of non-gun suicides. 
Additionally, in the analogous specifications for Texas, we estimate that gun shows reduce the 
number of gun homicides by 16 in the average year, with this representing just one percent of all 
homicides in the state.  
For the remainder of the paper, we focus on specifications that allow gun shows to 
influence mortality in zip codes within a 10-mile radius of the zip code in which the show 
occurred.  Results using alternative geographic areas are available from the authors upon request.   
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
In the preceding analysis, we use high frequency variation within jurisdictions to isolate 
the causal impact of gun shows from other factors that may be correlated with the presence of 
gun shows and with mortality rates.  Table 5 shows estimates derived from the model shown in 29 
equation (2), which includes indicators that allow us to examine whether there is any change in 
death rates leading up to a gun show.  Recall that this specification not only allows us to explore 
temporal substitution, but also serves as a specification check against contemporaneous events 
that might influence death rates and lead us to find a spurious correlation between gun shows and 
mortality.  Surveying the estimates in this table, we see no systematic evidence of changes in 
death rates leading up to a gun show. 
Table 6 explores whether the results above are sensitive to the model specification. 
Column 1 reproduces the baseline results for gun homicides from Table 3.  Column 2 shows 
estimates that are weighted by the total population in the zip code (from the 2000 census).  The 
results are extremely similar to the unweighted estimates.  Columns 3 and 4 show the 
exponentiated coefficients (and p-values in parentheses) from negative binomial and Poisson 
regressions where the outcome is the number of deaths.  The sample sizes for these regressions 
are smaller than the baseline because these models are estimated off of the set of observations for 
which there is at least one gun death in a given zip*year.  Column 5 shows the OLS estimates for 
this same sample to allow one to distinguish between differences due to sample size and those 
due to model specification.  Columns 6 through 10 present parallel specifications for gun 
suicides. While the magnitude of the Poisson and Negative Binomial estimates are somewhat 
smaller than the OLS estimates in several specifications (e.g., gun homicides in TX in week 1), 
the basic pattern of results – both magnitude and significance – is comparable across 
specifications.  
Table 7 explores the robustness of our results to alternative controls for unobservable 
factors, which might lead to spurious correlations.  In our baseline specification, we include zip 
code*year and month fixed effects.  In this table, we present results from three alternative sets of 30 
fixed effects:  separate main effects for month, year and zip code; separate main effects for week 
defined over the entire sample period (i.e., 1-569) and zip code; and week-of-year (i.e., 1-52) and 




Table 8 estimates our baseline specification separately for zip codes defined in terms of 
poverty and urbanicity.  We consider three mutually exclusive (and collectively exhaustive) 
groups: (1) zips in which at least 30 percent of the population is living in a rural area (as defined 
by the census); (2) zips in which less than 30 percent are living in a rural area and fewer than 10 
percent are below the poverty line; and (3) zips where fewer than 30 percent are living in a rural 
area but at least 10 percent are in poverty.   These groups are meant to roughly capture rural, 
urban non-poor and urban poor areas.  Results are not sensitive to moderate changes in the 
definition of these groups.  We find that the “perverse” gun-homicide effects in Texas are driven 
by gun shows in or near higher-poverty, urban areas; there is no effect (positive or negative) in 
the other zip code types.  The suicide effects in California appear in both the higher and lower-
poverty non-rural areas.   
Our sample spans 11 years, during which there were substantial economic and political 
changes, along with corresponding changes in national crime statistics.  For example, from 1994 
to 1999, the number of homicides in the U.S. decreased by more than 33%; from 1999 to 2004, 
the annual number of homicides began to slowly increase. As mentioned previously and shown 
in Figure 2, similar patterns are seen in the annual number of gun deaths in Texas and California. 
Gun deaths are decreasing until 1999 in California and 2000 in Texas. For this reason, we 31 
estimate our models separately for the six-year period from 1994-1999 and the five-year period 
from 2000-2004.  The results, shown in Table 9, suggest that the majority of the perverse Texas 
homicide effect is coming from the second half of our sample period whereas the significant 
California results come from the first half of our sample period.  One possible explanation of this 
finding in California is the enactment of the “nation's broadest legislation to increase oversight at 
gun shows” in California in 1999, which specified that gun show promoters must obtain a 
certificate of eligibility from the state Department of Justice following a background check 
(LCAV, 2008).
19 
To the extent that gun shows influence homicide and suicide rates by increasing the 
availability of guns, one might think that the effects would be smaller in locations where guns 
are more readily available.  While we do not have any direct measures of gun ownership, 
following Azrael, Cook, and Miller (2004), we use the fraction of suicides committed with a gun 
as a proxy for gun ownership. Specifically, Table 10 shows models in which we interact each of 
the gun show variables with the fraction of suicides committed with a gun in the zip code over 
the entire sample period.  We de-mean the fraction gun suicide so that the main effects of the gun 
show variables reflect the impact at the sample mean.  Note that the sample sizes are slightly 
smaller than in our baseline specifications because we exclude zip codes that did not experience 
any suicides over the entire sample period.  For California, none of these interactions are 
statistically significant.  In Texas, however, the interactions for the gun homicide outcomes 
(column 5) are negative, indicating that in zip codes with high gun ownership, gun shows are 
associated with even greater reductions in gun-related homicides than in zip codes with lower 
                                                 
19 This legislation also required that promoters: “(i) prepare security plans for gun shows and notify state and local 
law enforcement of those plans, (ii) certify that they will comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, 
(iii) obtain liability insurance in an amount not less than $1 million, (iv) ensure that all firearms brought into the 
shows are cleared of ammunition and tagged for identification purposes, and (v) prohibit anyone under age 18 from 
entering unless accompanied by a parent, grandparent, or legal guardian" (LCAV, 2008).  32 
gun ownership.  In order to explore whether this interaction is driven by the predominantly rural 
zip codes, the specification in column 6 includes a second set of interactions between the gun 
show variables and the percent of the zip code population living in a rural area.  The gun suicide 
results remain negative and significant.  One explanation for this finding is that the police 
response to gun shows is even greater in localities with already high gun ownership.   
 
VII.  Conclusion 
Thousands of gun shows take place in the U.S. every year. Gun control advocates argue 
that the “gun show loophole” that exists in many states makes it easier for potential criminals to 
obtain a gun.  Gun shows may also affect suicide rates by increasing the ease with which 
individuals who are contemplating suicide can obtain a more lethal device.  On the other hand, 
opponents of gun show regulations argue that gun shows are innocuous because potential 
criminals and other individuals can acquire guns easily through other channels. 
In this paper, we have investigated the effect of gun shows using eleven years of data on 
the date and location of every gun show in the states of California and Texas, the nation’s two 
most populous states. We have combined this with information on the date, location, and cause 
of every death occurring in these same two states during our eleven-year study period.  We focus 
our attention on homicides and suicides, with firearms accounting for 61 percent of the combined 
106,205 deaths from these two causes in California and Texas during the 1994 to 2004 period. 
Our identification strategy tests whether the number of homicides or suicides changes in 
the weeks immediately following a gun show.  We investigate separate models for the two states 
given that they sit at opposite ends of the spectrum with respect to their regulation of gun shows, 
with California arguably the strictest and Texas among the least stringent.  To the extent that 33 
regulations such as those in place in California reduce any deleterious effects of gun shows, one 
might expect to detect a larger effect in a relatively unregulated state such as Texas. 
Our results, however, provide no evidence to suggest that gun shows lead to a substantial 
increase in the number of homicides or suicides in either California or Texas.  If anything, we 
find evidence of a modest decline in the number of homicides following the average gun show in 
Texas, though our aggregate implied effects amount to just one percent of all homicides in the 
state of Texas. Taken together, our results suggest that gun shows do not increase the number of 
homicides or suicides and that the absence of gun show regulations does not increase the number 
of gun-related deaths as proponents of these regulations suggest. 
There are, however, two important caveats to our analyses.  First, we are considering only 
the effect in the geographic area immediately surrounding gun shows. To the extent that firearms 
purchased at gun shows are transported more than 25 miles away from the show, our 
identification strategy will not capture this effect. Additionally, we consider the effect only in the 
four weeks immediately following a gun show. However, guns are durable, and thus to the extent 
that effects occur much later, our analysis will not capture this.  34 
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 Table1. Weekly Gun-Related Deaths per 100,000 Residents
All Zip Codes
Zip Codes with 
no Gun Shows











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
California Zip Codes
All gun deaths 0.351 0.207 0.215 0.207 0.261 0.147 0.266 0.360
Gun suicides 0.226 0.111 0.088 0.112 0.161 0.071 0.165 0.233
Gun homicides 0.091 0.088 0.120 0.087 0.095 0.071 0.096 0.091
Accidental gun deaths 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006
Number of zip codes 1,664 98 98 98 901 901 901 1,566
Number of zip*weeks 941,824 55,468 1,121 54,347 509,966 20,496 489,470 886,356
Texas Zip Codes
All gun deaths 0.272 0.225 0.228 0.225 0.233 0.245 0.232 0.275
Gun suicides 0.183 0.138 0.143 0.138 0.128 0.115 0.130 0.186
Gun homicides 0.075 0.077 0.076 0.077 0.096 0.121 0.093 0.075
Accidental gun deaths 0.012 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.012
Number of zip codes 1,861 120 120 120 695 695 695 1,741
Number of zip*weeks 1,053,326 67,920 1,978 65,942 393,370 39,598 353,772 985,406
Zip Codes with 1+ Gun Shows
Notes: The cells contain the average number of gun-related deaths per capita for each week in relevant sample. The unit of observation is 
zip code*week. Population numbers based on the 2000 census. The zip codes in columns (2), (3) and (4) overlap with the zip codes in 
columns (5), (6) and (7). Specifically, the former are a subset of the latter. 
Zip Codes with 1+ Gun Shows within 






1+ Gun Shows 
within 10 Miles
No Gun Shows 
within 10 Miles
Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total population 31,817 19,634 12182*** 29,418 9,646 19,772***
(2056) (871)
2,930 3,193 -263 5,356 605 4,751***
(400) (220)
Land area (sq. miles) 71.2 68.2 3.0 25.9 118.5 -92.6***
(10.7) (6.9)
Fraction rural 0.12 0.36 -0.242*** 0.11 0.63 -0.519***
(0.025) (0.018)
Fraction Hispanic 0.28 0.24 0.044** 0.27 0.21 0.062***
(0.021) (0.011)
Fraction Black 0.06 0.04 0.015* 0.06 0.02 0.045***
(0.008) (0.004)
Fraction below poverty line 0.15 0.14 0.009 0.13 0.15 -0.016***
(0.009) (0.004)
Zip is in an MSA 0.84 0.83 0.008 0.94 0.70 0.239***
(0.039) (0.018)
Fraction of suicides by gun 0.49 0.53 -0.042** 0.48 0.60 -0.123***
(0.017) (0.013)
Total population 23,429 10,358 13,071*** 20,948 5,391 15,558***
(1493) (646)
1,088 869 218 2,114 150 1,964***
(149) (111)
Land area (sq. miles) 222.8 110.9 111.9*** 63.8 150.4 -86.6***
(35.3) (9.4)
Fraction rural 0.22 0.60 -0.375*** 0.19 0.80 -0.604***
(0.026) (0.016)
Fraction Hispanic 0.31 0.24 0.067*** 0.29 0.22 0.076***
(0.023) (0.012)
Fraction Black 0.11 0.08 0.027** 0.12 0.06 0.060***
(0.012) (0.007)
Fraction below poverty line 0.18 0.15 0.033*** 0.14 0.15 -0.012**
(0.009) (0.005)
Zip is in an MSA 0.62 0.53 0.085* 0.88 0.33 0.542***
(0.046) (0.019)
Fraction of suicides by gun 0.62 0.66 -0.036** 0.61 0.70 -0.090***
(0.018) (0.012)
Notes: Each cell in the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th columns contains the mean of the row variable for the sample indicated by the 
column header. The 3rd and 6th columns give the difference by regressing the row variable on the "whether there was a 
gun show" dummy. The unit of observation is zip code*week. There are fewer observations for "fraction of suicides by gun" 
because this variable is missing for those zips that had zero suicides from 1994 to 2004. *significant at 10%; **significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.






(population/sq. mile)Table 3. OLS, Gun and Non-Gun Homicides and Suicides
Gun Non-Gun Gun Non-Gun
Week of Show -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0019 0.0001
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0012)
1st Week Post-Show 0.0012 -0.0015** 0.0023* -0.0023*
(0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0013)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show 0.0001 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0007
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Observations (zip*weeks) 509,966 509,966 509,966 509,966
Number of zip codes 901 901 901 901
R-squared 0.121 0.033 0.033 0.034
Mean (dependent var) 0.035 0.013 0.025 0.028
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.203 0.117 0.159 0.176
Gun Non-Gun Gun Non-Gun
Week of Show -0.0022** -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0012
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0008)
1st Week Post-Show -0.0023** -0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0007
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0008)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show -0.0012 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0004
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Observations (zip*weeks) 393,370 393,370 393,370 393,370
Number of zip codes 695 695 695 695
R-squared 0.065 0.031 0.033 0.030
Mean (dependent var) 0.021 0.011 0.024 0.016
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.153 0.108 0.158 0.127
Within 10 Mile Radius
Homicides Suicides
California
Within 10 Mile Radius
Homicides Suicides
Notes: The sample for all regressions is zip codes that have at least one gun show within a 10 
mile radius during the sample period. The week of show, 1st week and 2-3 week lags indicate 
the number of gun shows within a 10 mile radius. The unit of observation is zip code*week. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by zip code.  Uses month and zip code*year 
fixed effects. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%. 
TexasTable 4. OLS, Gun and Non-Gun Homicides and Suicides
Gun Non-Gun Gun Non-Gun Gun Non-Gun Gun Non-Gun Gun Non-Gun Gun Non-Gun
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Week of Show 0.0092 -0.0025 -0.0045 -0.0112** 0.0019 0.0026* -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0008
(0.0064) (0.0038) (0.0062) (0.0046) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006)
1st Week Post-Show 0.0039 -0.0060* 0.0035 0.0041 0.0022 -0.0019 0.0037* -0.0049** 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0009 -0.0008
(0.0085) (0.0031) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show -0.0023 0.0046* 0.0007 -0.0034 -0.0006 0.0029*** 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0006
(0.0052) (0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Observations (zip*weeks) 55,468 55,468 55,468 55,468 271,680 271,680 271,680 271,680 783,344 783,344 783,344 783,344
Number of zip codes 98 98 98 98 480 480 480 480 1,384 1,384 1,384 1,384
R-squared 0.065 0.029 0.031 0.032 0.115 0.031 0.030 0.032 0.120 0.034 0.035 0.037
Mean (dependent var) 0.030 0.015 0.032 0.033 0.039 0.015 0.028 0.032 0.025 0.010 0.021 0.022
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.184 0.129 0.179 0.183 0.214 0.125 0.168 0.179 0.174 0.102 0.145 0.157
Gun Non-Gun Gun Non-Gun Gun Non-Gun Gun Non-Gun Gun Non-Gun Gun Non-Gun
Week of Show 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0077** 0.0007 -0.0029* -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0013** 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0003
(0.0042) (0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
1st Week Post-Show -0.0041 0.0016 0.0008 -0.0043 -0.0022 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0010* -0.0004 -0.0010** -0.0003
(0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0046) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show 0.0024 0.0057* 0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0014 0.0019* 0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0009** -0.0002
(0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Observations (zip*weeks) 67,920 6,7920 67,920 67,920 201,496 201,496 201,496 201,496 800,890 800,890 800,890 800,890
Number of zip codes 120 120 120 120 356 356 356 356 1,415 1,415 1,415 1,415
R-squared 0.041 0.025 0.032 0.028 0.066 0.030 0.032 0.029 0.064 0.033 0.037 0.033
Mean (dependent var) 0.017 0.011 0.031 0.018 0.024 0.013 0.027 0.018 0.012 0.007 0.016 0.010
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.136 0.111 0.177 0.135 0.165 0.117 0.165 0.134 0.118 0.084 0.129 0.102
Notes: The sample for columns (1) through (4) is zip codes that have at least one gun show during the sample period. For columns (5) through (8) it is zip codes that have at 
least one gun show within a 5 mile radius during the sample period. And for columns (9) through (12) it is zip codes that have at least one gun show within a 25 mile radius 
during the sample period. The week of show, 1st week and 2-3 week lags indicate the number of gun shows within zip code, within a 5 mile radius, and within a 25 mile radius 
for the respective samples. The unit of observation is zip code*week. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by zip code.  Uses month and zip code*year fixed effects. 












Within 25 Mile Radius
Homicides Suicides
Within 25 Mile RadiusTable 5. Robustness Checks, By State, Within 10 Mile Radius
Gun Homicides Gun Suicides
3-4 Weeks Pre-Show 0.0000 -0.0013
(0.0010) (0.0008)
2nd Week Pre-Show 0.0009 0.0007
(0.0015) (0.0012)
1st Week Pre-Show -0.0010 0.0004
(0.0014) (0.0012)
Week of Show -0.0007 -0.0019
(0.0012) (0.0012)
1st Week Post-Show 0.0012 0.0023*
(0.0015) (0.0012)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Observations (zip*weeks) 509966 509966
Number of Zipcodes 901 901
R-squared 0.121 0.033
Mean (dependent var) 0.035 0.025
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.203 0.159
Gun Homicides Gun Suicides
3-4 Weeks Pre-Show -0.0008 0.0007
(0.0008) (0.0007)
2nd Week Pre-Show -0.0010 -0.0004
(0.0011) (0.0010)
1st Week Pre-Show -0.0002 0.0030***
(0.0011) (0.0010)
Week of Show -0.0024** 0.0006
(0.0011) (0.0009)
1st Week Post-Show -0.0024** -0.0001
(0.0011) (0.0010)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show -0.0012 0.0003
(0.0008) (0.0007)
Observations (zip*weeks) 393370 393370
Number of Zipcodes 695 695
R-squared 0.065 0.033
Mean (dependent var) 0.021 0.024
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.153 0.158
California
Texas
Notes: The sample is all zip codes that have at least one gun show within a 
10 mile radius during the sample period. All leads and lags indicate the 
number of gun shows within a 10 mile radius. The unit of observation is zip 
code*week. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by zip code.  Uses 
month and zip code*year fixed effects. * significant at 10%; **significant at 
5%;  *** significant at 1%.   Table 6: OLS, NB and Poisson, By State, Within 10 Mile Radius
OLS, # of deaths  OLS, # of deaths  NB, # of  Poisson, #  OLS, # of deaths  OLS, # of deaths  OLS, # of deaths  NB, # of  Poisson, #  OLS, # of deaths 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Week of Show -0.0007 -0.0017 0.965 0.972 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0015 0.928 0.928 -0.0030
(0.0012) (0.0018) (0.340) (0.454) (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.140) (0.118) (0.0019)
1st Week Post-Show 0.0012 0.0024 1.023 1.038 0.0024 0.0023* 0.0020 1.091** 1.090* 0.0037*
(0.0015) (0.0025) (0.651) (0.498) (0.0030) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.050) (0.057) (0.0019)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show 0.0001 -0.0001 0.994 0.997 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 1.002 1.001 0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0014) (0.871) (0.913) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.941) (0.968) (0.0014)
Observations (zip*weeks) 509,966 509,966 245,530 245,530 245,530 509,966 509,966 308,743 308,743 308,743
Number of zip codes 901 901 774 774 774 901 901 844 844 844
R-squared 0.121 0.126 0.092 0.033 0.029 0.017
Mean (dependent var) 0.035 0.035 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.025 0.025 0.041 0.041 0.041
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.203 0.203 0.288 0.288 0.288 0.159 0.159 0.203 0.203 0.203
OLS, # of deaths  OLS, # of deaths  NB, # of  Poisson, #  OLS, # of deaths  OLS, # of deaths  OLS, # of deaths  NB, # of  Poisson, #  OLS, # of deaths 
Week of Show -0.0022** -0.0031* 0.949 0.936** -0.0039** 0.0001 0.0011 1.005 1.005 0.0002
(0.0010) (0.0016) (0.136) (0.029) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.878) (0.892) (0.0014)
1st Week Post-Show -0.0023** -0.0040** 0.947* 0.932** -0.0041** -0.0005 -0.0006 0.980 0.980 -0.0008
(0.0010) (0.0017) (0.096) (0.047) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.554) (0.548) (0.0014)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show -0.0012 -0.0029* 0.984 0.969 -0.0020 0.0000 -0.0002 1.002 1.002 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0015) (0.572) (0.255) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.948) (0.948) (0.0011)
Observations (zip*weeks) 393,370 393,370 170,761 170,761 170,761 393,370 393,370 236,604 236,604 236,604
Number of zip codes 695 695 608 608 608 695 695 650 650 650
R-squared 0.065 0.069 0.041 0.033 0.029 0.017
Mean (dependent var) 0.021 0.021 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.024 0.024 0.041 0.041 0.041
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.153 0.153 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.158 0.158 0.202 0.202 0.202
Notes:  Standard errors (clustered by zip code) are in parenthesis for the OLS regressions. For NB and Poisson regressions, exponentiated coefficients are reported with p-values in parenthesis. The sample 
for the first two OLS regressions is zip codes with at least one gun show within a 10 mile radius during the sample period. The sample for the NB and Poisson regressions is a subset of those zip codes - 
specifically, the subset of zip*weeks for which there is at least one non-zero gun death outcome variable during a given year. The regression marked "OLS, # of deaths (limited sample)" uses the same sample 
as the non-linear models. The week of show, 1st week and 2-3 week lags indicate the number of gun shows within a 10 mile radius. The unit of observation is zip code*week. All regressions use month and zip 
code*year fixed effects.  * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%.  
California
Gun Homicides Gun Suicides
Texas
Gun Homicides Gun SuicidesTable 7. Robustness Checks, By State, Within 10 Mile Radius
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Week of Show -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0020* -0.0020* -0.0018
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012)
1st Week Post-Show 0.0006 0.0006 0.0010 0.0022* 0.0022* 0.0024**
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0000
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Observations (zip*weeks) 509,966 509,966 509,966 509,966 509,966 509,966














R-squared 0.097 0.098 0.121 0.015 0.016 0.033
Mean (dependent var) 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.025 0.025 0.025
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.159 0.159 0.159
Week of Show -0.0019** -0.0017* -0.0022** 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
1st Week Post-Show -0.0021** -0.0019* -0.0023** -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Observations (zip*weeks) 393,370 393,370 393,370 393,370 393,370 393,370














R-squared 0.044 0.046 0.065 0.015 0.016 0.033
Mean (dependent var) 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.024 0.024 0.024
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.158 0.158 0.158
Notes: The sample for all regressions is zip codes that have at least one gun show within a 10 mile radius during the sample 
period. The week of show, 1st week and 2-3 week lags indicate the number of gun shows within a 10 mile radius. Columns (1) 
and (4) use month, year and zip code fixed effects. Columns (2) and (5) use week (definined over the entire period, i.e. 1-569) 
and zip code fixed effects. Columns (3) and (6) use week-of-year (i.e. 1-52) and zip code*year fixed effects. Standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered by zipcode. The unit of observation is zip code*week. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;  *** 
significant at 1%.   
California
Gun Homicides Gun Suicides
Texas













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Week of Show 0.0025 -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0028 -0.0016 -0.0020
(0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0017) (0.0018)
1st Week Post-Show -0.0011* 0.0013 0.0012 -0.0028 0.0032* 0.0020
(0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0018)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show 0.0021 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0006 -0.0004
(0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Observations (zip*weeks) 57,166 201,496 251,304 57,166 201,496 251,304
Number of zip codes 101 356 444 101 356 444
R-squared 0.024 0.036 0.116 0.037 0.029 0.032
Mean (dependent var) 0.002 0.011 0.062 0.002 0.011 0.062
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.042 0.111 0.269 0.042 0.111 0.269
Overall fraction of state's 













Week of Show -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0038** -0.0012 0.0013 -0.0004
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0012)
1st Week Post-Show -0.0000 0.0011 -0.0046*** -0.0008 0.0008 -0.0012
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0013)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show 0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0019 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0003
(0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0010)
Observations (zip*weeks) 88,296 119,992 185,082 88,296 119,992 185,082
Number of zip codes 156 212  327 156 212  327
R-squared 0.025 0.029 0.064 0.033 0.030 0.031
Mean (dependent var) 0.004 0.011 0.036 0.004 0.011 0.036
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.071 0.107 0.199 0.071 0.107 0.199
Overall fraction of state's 
zips in each category 0.61 0.14 0.24 0.61 0.14 0.24
California
Gun Homicides Gun Suicides
Notes: The sample for all regressions is zip codes that have at least one gun show within a 10 mile radius during the sample period. 
The week of show, 1st week and 2-3 week lags indicate the number of gun shows within a 10 mile radius. Standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered by zipcode. The unit of observation is zip code*week. Uses month and zip code*year fixed effects. * 
significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%.   
Texas
Gun Homicides Gun SuicidesTable 9. OLS, Gun Homicides and Suicides, Split by Year, Within 10 Mile Radius
1994-1999 2000-2004 1994-1999 2000-2004
Week of Show -0.0015 0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0025
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0019)
1st Week Post-Show 0.0015 0.0006 0.0040*** -0.0011
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0019)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0006
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Observations (zip*weeks) 279,310 230,656 279,310 230,656
Number of zip codes 901 901 901 901
R-squared 0.127 0.112 0.034 0.030
Mean (dependent var) 0.038 0.031 0.027 0.022
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.213 0.191 0.165 0.150
1994-1999 2000-2004 1994-1999 2000-2004
Week of Show -0.0021 -0.0021 0.0007 -0.0007
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014)
1st Week Post-Show -0.0014 -0.0034** -0.0011 0.0005
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0017)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show -0.0015 -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0010
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0012)
Observations (zip*weeks) 215,450 177,920 215,450 177,920
Number of zip codes 695 695 695 695
R-squared 0.069 0.058 0.035 0.030
Mean (dependent var) 0.023 0.018 0.025 0.023
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.162 0.142 0.161 0.153
California
Gun Homicides Gun Suicides
Notes: The sample for all regressions is zip codes that have at least one gun show within a 10 
mile radius during the sample period. The week of show, 1st week and 2-3 week lags indicate 
the number of gun shows within a 10 mile radius. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered 
by zipcode. The unit of observation is zip code*week. Uses month and zip code*year fixed 
effects. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%.   
Texas





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Week of Show -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0020* -0.0025** -0.0020** 0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
1st Week Post-Show 0.0013 0.0012 0.0026** 0.0023* -0.0026** -0.0017* -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Week of Show -0.0068 -0.0073 -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0102** -0.0109** 0.0007 0.0014
(0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0036) (0.0037)
1st Week Post-Show 0.0035 0.0038 0.0084 0.0096 -0.0113** -0.0126*** 0.0031 0.0032
(0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0043) (0.0044)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0034 -0.0035 -0.0054 -0.0061 -0.0020 -0.0021
(0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0029) (0.0030)
Week of Show 0.0019 -0.0013 0.0038 -0.0035
(0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0028) (0.0031)
1st Week Post-Show -0.0016 -0.0053 0.0071** -0.0006
(0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0030) (0.0035)
2-3 Weeks Post-Show 0.0049* 0.0005 0.0042 0.0002
(0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0025)
Observations (zip*weeks) 493,552 493,552 493,552 493,552 379,786 379,786 379,786 379,786
Number of zip codes 872 872 872 872 671 671 671 671
R-squared 0.120 0.120 0.032 0.032 0.064 0.064 0.032 0.032
Mean (dependent var) 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
Std. Dev (dependent var) 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156
10th Pcntl (interaction var) 0.278 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.400 0.000
25th Pcntl (interaction var) 0.393 0.000 0.393 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.500 0.000
50th Pcntl (interaction var) 0.481 0.000 0.481 0.000 0.621 0.009 0.621 0.009
75th Pcntl (interaction var) 0.571 0.034 0.571 0.034 0.700 0.212 0.700 0.212
90th Pcntl (interaction var) 0.667 0.274 0.667 0.274 0.800 0.710 0.800 0.710
INTERACTION 
TERMS         
(1st Set)
INTERACTION 
TERMS         
(2nd Set)
Gun Homicides
Notes: The sample for all regressions is zip codes that have at least one gun show within a 10 mile radius during the sample period. The main effects indicate the number of gun 
shows during that lag within a 10 mile radius. The first set of interaction terms is each lag multiplied by the demeaned "fraction gun suicide" variable. The second set of interaction 
terms is each lag multiplied by the demeaned percent rural variable. Fraction gun suicide and percent rural are demeaned by their average over the observations in the regression 
sample. Percentiles listed for the two-interaction regressions are for percent rural; the percentiles for fraction gun suicide are the same as in the one-interaction regressions. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by zipcode. The smaller number of observations for the regression with the "fraction gun suicide" interaction is because this variable 
is missing for zip codes with zero suicides over the entire period. The unit of observation is zip code*week. Uses month and zip*year fixed effects. * significant at 10%; **significant 
at 5%;  *** significant at 1%.
Gun Suicides Gun Homicides Gun Suicides
MAIN EFFECTS 
(# of gun shows 
within zip or 10 
mile radius)
California TexasAppendix Table 1. Demographic, Gun Show and Gun Death Characteristics for California and Texas Zip Codes
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
3-4 Weeks Pre-Show 0.004 0 0.067 0.010 0 0.102
2nd Week Pre-Show 0.002 0 0.047 0.005 0 0.072
1st Week Pre-Show 0.002 0 0.047 0.005 0 0.072
Week of Show 0.002 0 0.047 0.005 0 0.072
1st Week Post-Show 0.002 0 0.047 0.005 0 0.072
2-3 Weeks Post-Show 0.004 0 0.067 0.010 0 0.102
3-4 Weeks Pre-Show 0.081 0 0.283 0.205 0 0.443
2nd Week Pre-Show 0.041 0 0.200 0.103 0 0.310
1st Week Pre-Show 0.041 0 0.200 0.103 0 0.310
Week of Show 0.041 0 0.200 0.103 0 0.310
1st Week Post-Show 0.041 0 0.200 0.103 0 0.310
2-3 Weeks Post-Show 0.082 0 0.284 0.205 0 0.445
Deaths 3.686 3.000 3.254 2.616 2.000 2.692
Gun deaths 0.061 0 0.266 0.047 0 0.228
Gun homicides 0.035 0 0.203 0.021 0 0.153
Non-gun homicides 0.013 0 0.117 0.011 0 0.108
Gun suicides 0.025 0 0.159 0.024 0 0.158
Non-gun suicides 0.028 0 0.176 0.016 0 0.127
Accidental/undetermined gun deaths 0.002 0 0.039 0.002 0 0.040
Total population 29,418 27,452 20,687 20,948 19,023 15,444
Land area (sq. miles) 26 7 56 64 13 182
Population density (population/sq. mile) 5,356 3,455 6,273 2,114 1,329 2,885
Fraction urban 0.89 1.00 0.26 0.81 0.99 0.32
Fraction of population in urbanized area 0.84 1.00 0.34 0.72 0.99 0.41
Fraction of population in urban cluster 0.05 0.00 0.19 0.08 0.00 0.23
Fraction rural 0.11 0.00 0.26 0.19 0.01 0.32
Fraction rural, farm 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03
Fraction rural, non-farm 0.10 0.00 0.25 0.19 0.01 0.30
Fraction White 0.63 0.65 0.22 0.71 0.75 0.20
Fraction Black 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.17
Fraction Native American 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
Fraction Asian 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.025 0.012 0.034
Fraction Pacific Islander 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fraction other race 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.10
Fraction multi-race 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
Fraction non-Hispanic 0.73 0.80 0.22 0.71 0.80 0.25
Fraction Hispanic 0.27 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.20 0.25
Fraction poverty status checked 0.98 0.99 0.07 0.97 0.99 0.10
Fraction with income below poverty line 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.10
Fraction with income above povery line 0.84 0.87 0.12 0.82 0.85 0.14
Fraction of suicides by gun 0.48 0.48 0.18 0.61 0.62 0.19
Mean per capita income ($) 25,196 21,373 14,830 20,886 17,657 14,569
Number/week
Notes: The sample is limited to zip codes with at least one gun show within a 10 mile radius show during the sample 
period. In California, this corresponds to 901 zip codes and 509,966 zip*years. In Texas, this corresponds to 695 zip 
codes and 393,370 zip*years. In rows 1 through 6, the leads and lags indicate the number of gun shows within the zip 
code during that lead/lag. For rows 7 through 12, the leads and lags indicate the number of gun shows within a 10 mile 
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